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Affirmatively Inefficient Jurisprudence?: 
Confusing Contractors’ Rights to Raise 
Affirmative Defenses with Sovereign 
Immunity
Steven L. Schooner* & Pamela J. Kovacs**
It is as much the duty of government to render prompt justice against itself, in favor of 
citizens, as it is to administer the same, between private individuals.1
Since a party cannot know what her defense is until she hears the claim leveled against 
her, it seems that it would be nearly impossible for a party to submit future hypothetical 
defenses to the administrative claims procedure—defenses to lawsuits which may not yet 
have [been] brought against her or which may never be brought at all.2
Introduction
With its 2010 decision in M. Maropakis Carpentry v. United States,3 the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upset the commonly understood 
rules of practice and procedure for government contracts dispute litigation. 
The Maropakis court, in what the Supreme Court might view as a drive-by 
jurisdictional ruling,4 held that a contractor must file its own claim for time 
extensions before it can defend against a government claim for liquidated 
damages.5 Initially, many feared that the decision would create a significant, 
* Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government Procurement Law and Co-Director of the 
Government Procurement Law Program, The George Washington University Law School. 
Professor Schooner previously served in the Office of Management and Budget, the De-
partment of Justice, and the Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps. Professor Schooner is a 
director of the Procurement Round Table and a Fellow of the National Contract Management 
Association. The authors gratefully acknowledge Seymour Herman for his continued support 
of government procurement law research at The George Washington University Law School 
and Jack Friedenthal, Daniel Gordon, Alan Morrison, Ralph Nash, Ray Pushkar, and Heidi 
Schooner for their helpful comments and insights.
** Juris Doctor, The George Washington University Law School.
1 Abraham Lincoln, First Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1861), in 5 The Collected Works 
of Abraham Lincoln, 35, 44 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
2 Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City Sav., F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 395 (3rd Cir. 1994).
3 M. Maropakis Carpentry v. United States (Maropakis II), 609 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
4 See infra text accompanying notes 176–185.
5 Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1331–32.
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disruptive, and—from the contractors’ perspective—disadvantageous 
change in procedural posture for a large number of contractors defending 
against government claims.6 These fears rapidly evolved into reality with 
two U.S. Court of Federal Claims (“COFC”) cases interpreting Maropakis.7 
Accordingly, practitioners now can confirm that the change breeds inefficiency 
and uncertainty in the contract disputes process, thereby increasing costs for 
both contractors and the government (without providing any corresponding 
benefit).8 If unchecked, Maropakis may reflect one of the most significant 
changes in government-contracts litigation posture since the flurry of 
jurisdictional litigation following the late-1970s enactment of the Contract 
Disputes Act (“CDA” or “the Act”).9
This is particularly frustrating to the extent that Maropakis does not appear 
well-grounded in relevant precedent and seems to ignore the realities of the 
congressionally mandated contract disputes process.10 The Federal Circuit—as 
it too often does—appears to have relied on a rigid, formalistic interpretation 
of the CDA.11 The resulting rule creates expensive inefficiencies in the contract 
disputes context,12 which, unavoidably, result in costly, unproductive litigation.13 
Moreover, the scope of the rule’s application remains unclear.14 To avoid 
wasteful litigation, remedy the court’s departure from precedent, and restore 
6 See, e.g., Ralph C. Nash, Defense to a Government Claim Is a Contractor Claim: A Weird 
Thought, 24 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 42 (Sept. 2010) [hereinafter Nash, A Weird Thought]; 
Raymond S.E. Pushkar & Justin M. Ganderson, Federal Circuit Contravenes Purposes of 
CDA in Holding on Government Liquidated Damages Assessments, BNA Fed. Cont. Rep., 
July 20, 2010, at 6; Steven L. Schooner, A Random Walk: The Federal Circuit’s 2010 Govern-
ment Contracts Decisions, 60 Am. U. L. Rev. 1067, 1097–99 (2011) [hereinafter Schooner, 
A Random Walk].
7 See Structural, Inc. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 84 (2012); Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. 
v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 38 (2011).
8 See, e.g., Pushkar & Ganderson, supra note 6, at 6–8.
9 Contract Disputes Act (CDA), 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7109 (Supp. V 2011); see also W. 
Stanfield Johnson, A Retrospective on the Contract Disputes Act, 28 Pub. Cont. L.J. 567, 
569–70 (1999) [hereinafter Johnson, A Retrospective on the CDA].
10 See Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1098; see also Nash, A Weird Thought, 
supra note 6, at 135.
11 See Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1095.
12 Steven L. Schooner, Postscript: Defense to a Government Claim Is a Contractor Claim, 
26 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 6 (Feb. 2012) [hereinafter Schooner, Postscript].
13 See id.
14 See id. at 19.
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contractors’ rights to an equal playing field in litigating with their government 
customer, a statutory solution appears to be required.15
Part I of this Article will discuss Maropakis, prior case law on the issue, and 
the relevant waiver of sovereign immunity, the CDA. Part II will describe, and, 
in so doing, applaud, Judge Newman’s dissent in Maropakis, which respected 
the status quo in CDA litigation utilizing a fair and reasonable analysis. Part 
II also explains how the majority’s formalistic decision contradicts general 
principles of civil procedure. Part III proposes a simple statutory amendment 
to the CDA.
This Article does not suggest that any theory proffered within it is particularly 
unique, innovative, or even profound, but that does not diminish the 
importance of its message. Courts make mistakes, but, fortunately, the nature 
of our common-law regime is such that errors need not become permanent 
or indefinitely lead to inefficient, ineffective, or unfair results. Accordingly, 
the Federal Circuit should revisit the substance of Maropakis, en banc, at 
the first opportunity. Until then, contractor (plaintiff’s) counsel should seek 
en banc review in any related cases or, where appropriate, consider amicus 
briefing.16 The Justice Department’s attorneys should exercise their discretion 
and refrain from exploiting Maropakis (remaining mindful that, ultimately, 
their responsibility must be to “do Justice”). Contractor (plaintiff’s) counsel 
should craft arguments that persuade individual COFC judges to avoid the 
harsh and inefficient application of Maropakis. The administrative judges on 
the agency boards of contract appeals should stay the course and, if necessary, 
15 As discussed below, the decision arises in the context of the CDA, over which the 
Federal Circuit exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, there is no potential 
demonstration of a split amongst the circuit, nor does there appear another convenient route 
to achieve certiorari review in the Supreme Court.
16 See generally Robert K. Huffman, Federal Circuit Decisions on Government Contracts: 
Insights from the Roundtable, 24 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 7, at 27–28 (Feb. 2010):
Judge Michel said that the Federal Circuit would welcome briefs from amici curiae in 
considering such requests for en banc resolution. Amici participation would help the 
Federal Circuit understand the “downstream,” or real-world, effects of its prior and/
or potential decisions in the Government contracts arena.
 . . . Judge Michel stated his belief that the Federal Circuit could be persuaded to grant 
en banc review in the appropriate case. He stated that dissents [such as Judge Newman’s 
in Maropakis] were important in persuading the Court to grant en banc review, and he 
reiterated that amicus briefs were very important in helping the Court to determine 
whether to take a particular case en banc. Judge Michel also stated that it was perfectly 
appropriate for an appellant or amici to argue that en banc initial consideration of a second 
appeal is appropriate years after a prior precedent relevant to the appeal on the basis that 
the prior precedent was wrongly decided and had adverse practical consequences.
Id. (emphasis added) (italics omitted).
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distinguish Maropakis.17 And, of course, if the Federal Circuit fails to remedy 
the situation, Congress should craft and enact a legislative solution.
I. M. Maropakis Carpentry v. United States: Depriving 
Contractors of Their Right to Defend
In M. Maropakis Carpentry v. United States, the Federal Circuit deprived a 
contractor of its right to defend itself in litigation against a government claim 
for money, specifically, liquidated damages.18 The court’s rigid, formalistic 
reading of precedent and the CDA19 unnecessarily opens a complicated can 
of worms.
Granted, M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. (“Maropakis”) is not the most 
sympathetic character. The company spent more than two years completing 
a construction and repair work contract for the U.S. Navy that was originally 
scheduled to take only nine months.20 Still, the contractor faced many obstacles.21 
It took months for the contractor to locate a manufacturer to custom-make 
the windows to meet the Navy’s admittedly overly strict specifications.22 The 
government suspended all work on the contract for three-and-a-half months 
after the contractor located lead-based paint in the building.23 Throughout, 
the Navy refused to allow the contractor to mitigate the lost time by altering 
the sequential order of the project’s phases.24 In total, contract completion 
was delayed by 467 days.25 As a result, the contracting officer (“CO”) assessed 
$303,550 in liquidated damages pursuant to the contract’s liquidated damages 
clause,26 which stipulated that Maropakis was liable to the government for 
17 See, e.g., Nat’l Fruit Prod. Co. v Dep’t of Agric., CBCA No. 2445, 2012 WL 1059477 
(March 26, 2012).
18 Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1334–35 (Newman, J., dissenting).
19 Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1095, 1098.
20 See M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States (Maropakis I), 84 Fed. Cl. 182, 
191 (2008).
21 See id.
22 Id. at 188, 191 (stating that the Navy had admitted that the specification’s unusually 
high standard for the windows was an error, but refused to lower the standard because it 
would be unfair to the other bidders on the contract).
23 See id. at 189–90.
24 Id. at 187.
25 Id. at 191.
26 See generally 48 C.F.R. § 52.211–12(a) (2000) (stating that “[i]f the Contractor fails to 
complete the work within the time specified in the contact, the Contractor shall pay liquidated 
damages to the Government in the amount of ___ [Contracting Officer insert amount] for 
each calendar day of delay until the work is completed or accepted” (alteration in original)).
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$650 per day for each day the contract was delayed beyond the contract 
completion date (or any extensions).27
Throughout the contract’s duration, Maropakis requested time extensions, 
arguing that the government caused the delays.28 Maropakis, however, never 
(properly) submitted a formal “claim” to the CO for a time extension.29 
Maropakis ultimately filed suit in the COFC,30 seeking time extensions 
and remission of the government’s assessment of liquidated damages.31 The 
government in turn filed a counterclaim for the payment of the $59,514 
balance for liquidated damages.32
The COFC concluded that, because Maropakis had never submitted a 
formal “claim” to the CO for time extensions, the court lacked jurisdiction to 
hear the contractor’s claim.33 The court also held, however, that, while it had 
jurisdiction over the government’s claim for liquidated damages, the contractor 
could not defend against the government’s claim because the court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over the contractor’s defense that the government 
had caused the delays.34 The Federal Circuit (in a two-to-one decision) in 
Maropakis,35 upheld the lower court’s ruling, finding that, pursuant to the 
CDA, the contractor must have filed its own claim with the CO in order to 
challenge the government’s claim for liquidated damages before the COFC.36
27 Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1325–26 (noting that the Navy withheld a final payment 
otherwise due to Maropakis under the contract, in the amount of $244,036, thus resulting 
in a total amount due from Maropakis of $59,514).
28 The court related that the contractor requested an extension of 447 calendar days:
based on five alleged delays: (1) 187 days due to the inability to locate a window 
manufacturer; (2) 32 days in time lost from the start date of fabrication of windows due 
to the need to re-submit plans; (3) 107 days due to the discovery of lead-based paint; 
(4) 20 days due to the Navy’s prohibition of the use of asphalt as a roofing adhesive; 
and (5) 101 days for time lost while searching for a metal fabricator.
Id.
29 Id. at 1326. In retrospect, Maropakis’s counsel had numerous opportunities to avoid 
much of the jurisdictional chicanery that would follow.
30 This Article also references decisions from the Claims Court (trial court) and the Court 
of Claims, which were predecessors to the COFC. All three courts will be referenced for 
precedential value. General references to decisions from the COFC include decisions from 
the Claims Court and the Court of Claims.
31 Maropakis I, 84 Fed. Cl. 182, 193–94 (2008).
32 Id. at 194.
33 Id. at 205, 208.
34 Id. at 208; Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1097.
35 Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1331–32 (Fed Cir. 2010). As discussed below, Judge 
Newman filed a vigorous dissent. See infra Part II.A.
36 Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1331–32.
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The Federal Circuit appears to have agreed that the assessment of liquidated 
damages constituted a government claim under the CDA.37 Nonetheless, the 
court found that the only defense raised by Maropakis was that it was entitled 
to a time extension, reasoning that any time extension would necessarily 
modify the contract terms.38 The court reasoned that, to obtain a modification 
to the contract terms, the contractor must follow the requirements of the 
CDA and submit its own claim to the CO.39 The court thus affirmed the 
finding of the COFC, which dismissed the contractor’s claims for lack of 
jurisdiction, and granted the government’s motion for summary judgment 
as to the counterclaim for liquidated damages.40
Precedent and conventional wisdom prior to Maropakis was that the CDA’s 
jurisdictional predicates did not apply to affirmative defenses.41 Granted, 
the Federal Circuit had stopped short of directly addressing the issue,42 and 
the COFC and the BCAs had inconsistently addressed the extent to which 
a contractor could assert a factual defense to a government claim without 
meeting the jurisdictional requirements associated with filing an affirmative 
CDA claim.43 Still, the Federal Circuit had not previously held that a contractor 
could not challenge a CO’s adverse government claim without submitting a 
separate affirmative claim.44
For example, in Placeway Construction Corp. v. United States, the court 
held that the government’s refusal to disburse the remaining amount under 
a contract constituted a government claim.45 Because the CO’s decision to 
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. “Thus, we hold that a contractor seeking an adjustment of contract terms must meet 
the jurisdictional requirements and procedural prerequisites of the CDA, whether asserting 
the claim against the government as an affirmative claim or as a defense to a government 
action.” Id. at 1331.
40 Id. at 1332.
41 See id. at 1329–30; see also Schooner, Postscript, supra note 12, at 18.
42 Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1330 n.1.
43 Compare Kemron Envtl. Servs. Corp., ASBCA No. 51536, 00-1 BCA ¶ 30,664 (1999) 
(allowing a contractor to defend against the government’s liquidated damages claim by prov-
ing that the government had contributed to the delay), with Elgin Builders, Inc. v. United 
States, 10 Cl. Ct. 40, 44 (1986) (stating that without submitting a claim of its own, the 
only defense a contractor could assert to the government’s liquidated damages claim was 
that there was no delay in contract completion).
44 Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
45 Id. at 906 (stating that a government claim does not require certification under the 
CDA). The Court defined a government claim as “a claim seeking incidental and consequen-
tial damages for Placeway’s alleged breach of the contract, in particular, failure to complete 
performance on the date set in the contract.” Id. at 906 n.1.
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withhold payment was adverse to the contractor, the court found that the 
contractor could properly appeal to the (then) Claims Court, despite the fact 
that the contractor had failed to certify its claim for the remaining amount.46 
Notably, the contractor in Placeway was initiating suit in court to recover the 
amount the government owed under the contract; even still, the court found 
that the contractor did not have to file its own claim in order to attempt to 
defeat the government’s claim withholding the amount.47 Similarly, in Garrett 
v. General Electric Co.,48 the court held that, under the CDA, a contractor may 
appeal a CO’s decision on a government claim without submitting a claim of 
its own to the CO.49 Because the court found that the government’s directive 
to perform remedial work constituted a government claim, the court held 
that the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals had jurisdiction over the 
contractor’s appeal despite the fact that the contractor had submitted no claims 
to the CO.50 Most significantly, the court held that the board’s jurisdiction 
rested solely on the Navy’s claims under the contract.51 Therefore, Federal 
Circuit precedent prior to Maropakis established that (1) a contractor can 
appeal a CO’s decision on a government claim without submitting a claim 
of its own and (2) the court’s or board’s jurisdiction in such cases is based 
solely on the government claim.52
While COFC and Boards of Contract Appeals (“BCA” or “board”) judges 
had differed—in degree—on this question directly before Maropakis, little 
suggested the path the Federal Circuit would take.53 Some cases had allowed 
contractors to present factual defenses to government claims without requiring 
the contractor to bring its own claim,54 while others allowed the contractor 
to bring only limited defenses without submission of an affirmative claim.55
46 Id. at 907.
47 Id. at 906–07.
48 Garrett v. Gen. Elec. Co., 987 F.2d 747 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
49 Id. at 749, 752; see also Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, 
J., dissenting) (citing Garrett, 987 F.2d at 749).
50 Garrett, 987 F.2d at 749.
51 Id.
52 Id.; see also Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1333 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing Garrett, 
987 F.2d at 749).
53 See supra note 34.
54 See, e.g., Kemron Envtl. Servs. Corp., ASBCA No. 51536, 00-1 BCA ¶ 30,664 (1999) 
(not only exercising jurisdiction over a contractor’s appeal from a liquidated damages assess-
ment, but also ruling in the contractor’s favor on the issue, despite the fact that the contractor 
had not submitted a claim to the CO).
55 See, e.g., Elgin Builders, Inc. v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 40, 44 (1986) (holding that 
a contractor could contest the government’s claim to liquidated damages by challenging the 
actual assessment, that is, by claiming that there was no delay or less delay in completion 
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In Sun Eagle Corp. v. United States,56 the Claims Court undertook a thorough 
examination of the difference between a contractor’s claim and defense.57 The 
Army assessed liquidated damages against Sun Eagle and withheld that amount 
from the remaining balance on the contract.58 Sun Eagle, in turn, submitted 
a claim letter, challenging the assessment of liquidated damages and asserting 
that the government caused the delays.59 The government moved to dismiss 
the contractor’s claim because it was not properly certified under the CDA.60
The court held that the plain meaning of the CDA requires a contractor 
to certify its own claim where it (1) submits its own claim letter to the CO 
and, of course, (2) seeks interest on the sum.61 Relying on Placeway, the 
court stated that, if a contractor did not submit its own claim letter to the 
CO, “it still could sue for that amount in the Claims Court by contesting 
the government claim, but would not receive a decision by the contracting 
officer on its own claim, nor would it be awarded interest if successful.”62 In 
Sun Eagle, certification was required to the extent that the contractor had 
filed its own claim with the CO seeking the amount withheld for liquidated 
damages—an amount in excess of the CDA threshold—with interest.63
In the end, the court did not directly address whether the court would in 
fact retain jurisdiction over the contractor’s defense of the government claim, 
because, between its first opinion and reconsideration, the parties engaged 
in settlement negotiations.64 The court stated, however, that if the contractor 
had not properly certified the claim, “the result would call for the dismissal 
without submitting its own claim, but that where a contractor’s defense actually claimed 
some type of relief, such as entitlement to time extensions, such a defense constituted a 
contractor claim, which must first be submitted to a CO for consideration before the court 
could exercise jurisdiction over the defense).
56 23 Cl. Ct. 465 (1991).
57 Id. at 476–82.
58 Id. at 474.
59 Id. at 476, 480.
60 Id. at 474 (citing the CDA).
61 Id. at 482. See generally 41 U.S.C. § 7109(a)(1) (Supp. V 2011) (“Interest . . . found 
due a contractor on a claim shall be paid to the contractor for the period beginning with 
the date the contracting officer receives the contractor’s claim . . . until the date of the pay-
ment of the claim.”)
62 Sun Eagle, 23 Cl. Ct. at 482 (citation omitted).
63 Id. (stating that “[t]he contractor made the claim in its claim letter and, if it recovers, 
the CDA would award the contractor interest on its claim”).
64 Id.
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of all of its contractor claims, and the court would retain jurisdiction only 
over the government claim.”65
Sun Eagle differentiated between a claim and a defense.66 In the first, the 
contractor submits a claim to the CO for recovery of funds withheld for 
liquidated damages and seeks interest on the sum.67 Conversely, in a defense 
to a government claim of liquidated damages, the contractor neither submits 
a claim to the CO nor seeks interest on it.68 The court held that a contractor 
must meet the jurisdictional prerequisites of the CDA for a claim but not 
with regard to a defense.69
The Maropakis majority reconciled Placeway and Garrett with its decision, 
agreeing that a court or board would have jurisdiction over a contractor’s 
appeal of an adverse ruling on a government claim.70 The court reasoned, 
however, that neither case addressed whether the lower court or the boards 
would have jurisdiction over a contractor’s defense where the contractor did 
not bring its own claim.71 The majority also found support for its decision in 
Sun Eagle, quoting the Claims Court’s language that, if a contractor did not 
meet the CDA’s jurisdictional prerequisites, the contractor’s claims would be 
dismissed, and the court would retain jurisdiction only over the government 
claim.72 We find this reading artificial and unduly restrictive.
Judge Newman read the precedent differently, finding that Sun Eagle 
specifically held that a contractor’s defense to a government claim did not 
need to satisfy the CDA’s jurisdictional prerequisites.73 Judge Newman also 
opined that Placeway and Garrett only addressed the court’s jurisdiction 
over the government claims and not the contractor’s defenses, because a 
defense does not have a jurisdictional dimension.74 Further, a more reasonable 
reading of Placeway and Garrett leads to the conclusion that the court would 
not explicitly rule that: (1) a contractor can appeal an adverse ruling on a 
government claim; and (2) the court’s jurisdiction in such cases is based on 
65 Id.; see also Roxco, Ltd. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 138, 147–48, 151 (2007) (hold-
ing that where the contractor had not submitted claims to the CO, the court would retain 
jurisdiction over the portion of the contractor’s claim that disputed the government’s liqui-
dated damages claim).




70 Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1330 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1331 n.2 (citing Sun Eagle, 23 Cl. Ct. at 482).
73 Id. at 1334 (citing Sun Eagle, 23 Cl. Ct. at 480).
74 Id. at 1333 (citing Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990), and Garrett v. Gen. Elec. Co., 987 F.2d 747, 749 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
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the government claim, if the court did not intend for the contractor to be 
able to make a defense once its appeal was heard.
II. Inconsistency, Injustice, and Uncertainty
The Federal Circuit erred in changing well-established law and practice. 
No statute, regulation, or policy appears to support its decision. Moreover, 
the impact—specifically, the inefficiency and expense associated with filing 
unnecessary claims and litigating unproductive jurisdictional issues—imposed 
upon the contractor community serves no productive end.75 While the Justice 
Department may enjoy wielding a new and potent wedge that interferes with 
contractors’ abilities to defend themselves in litigation, the public is ill served 
by this decision.76
It is tempting to conclude that the public is served, in the long run by 
court decisions that, on the one hand, limit contractor rights or remedies and, 
on the other hand, facilitate aggressive litigation postures advanced by the 
Department of Justice.77 Arguably, such precedent protects the government’s 
sovereign immunity and the public fisc.78 Yet, the government’s adoption of a 
scorched-earth litigation strategy may not make good economic sense. Each 
of these individual litigation victories may ultimately increase the prices that 
the government pays for the goods, services, and construction it procures. 
Limiting contractors’ rights to pursue valid claims or protect their interests 
through litigation “slowly and subtly, but inexorably changes the fundamental 
bargain between purchasing agencies and [contractors], which eventually leads 
to the government paying more for what it buys.”79
One of us previously described government efforts to constrain contractor-
disputes litigation as a “breach of the contingency promise.”80 Consider that the 
fundamental premise upon which most government contracts depend is that, 
in exchange for the contractor not inflating its price (at the time of contract 
award) as insurance against unanticipated problems that may arise during 
performance, the government promises to make the contractor whole—through 
a number of standard remedy-granting clauses—if any number of problems 
75 See Schooner, Postscript, supra note 12, at 18; see also Pushkar & Ganderson, supra 
note 6, at 7–8.
76 See Schooner, Postscript, supra note 12 at 18; see also Pushkar & Ganderson, supra note 
6, at 7–8; see also Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Business-
like Government, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 627, 695 (2001).
77 See Schooner, Fear of Oversight, supra note 76, at 695.
78 See id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 695–98.
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or contingencies do arise.81 This bargain makes particularly good business 
sense if (as experience suggests) problems are the exception, rather than the 
rule.82 If, however, the government signals to the contractor community that 
it does not intend to deal with its contractors on a level playing field and 
that it is willing to protect the public fisc without regard for the reasonable 
expectations of its business partners, contractors will increase their prices to 
protect themselves.83
Below, we accumulate a number of perspectives that reveal the error 
and injustice in the majority’s holding in Maropakis. We begin with Judge 
Newman’s dissent, which vehemently chronicles the flaws in the majority’s 
reasoning.84 We then highlight the Federal Circuit’s increasing tilt to a 
formalism that too often produces injustice, particularly in the government 
contracts context.85 We briefly review the purpose behind the CDA and find 
that Maropakis contravenes congressional intent. We examine some basic 
principles of civil procedure and find the majority opinion in Maropakis 
squarely at odds with these fundamental concepts. We offer an analysis of 
cases applying a similar statutory scheme—the Financial Institution Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”)—which reveals how the 
general jurisdiction circuit courts reached the opposite conclusion from the 
Federal Circuit in a strikingly similar context. Finally, we note that the recent 
COFC cases applying Maropakis starkly display the resulting inefficiency and 
uncertainty.
81 Id. at 695–96.
82 To the extent that relatively few contract disputes arise given the number of contracts 
the government enters into (and, of course, the hundreds of billions of dollars in purchasing 
the government engages in each year), the bargain proves quite efficient for the government 
and the taxpayer. More specifically, for example, fewer than 1,000 contract disputes reached 
the agency boards of contact appeals in Fiscal Year 2011 (432 at the ASBCA, Memorandum 
from Paul Williams, Chairman, ASBCA, to Sec’ys of Def., the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, 
Gen. of Dep’t of Def., and Dir. of the Def. Logistics Agency (Oct. 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.asbca.mil/Reports/FY2011%20Reports/FY2011_annual.pdf; 421 at the CBCA, 
Donald G. Featherstun & Kevin P. Connelly, Disputes, in West Government Contracts 
Year in Review Conference: Covering 2011 Conference Briefs 8-1 (2012); and 117 
at the COFC, U.S. Court of Federal Claims—Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending for 
the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2011, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/US_Court_of_Federal_Claims_all.pdf;), despite the 
fact that the federal government entered into millions of contracts worth more than $500 
billion for services, goods, and construction in each of the last four fiscal years.
83 Schooner, Fear of Oversight, supra note 76, at 696.
84 Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1332–35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting).
85 Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1069.
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A. The Newman Dissent: Fairness and Common Sense 
(or, Well, Justice)
Judge Newman filed a vigorous dissent in Maropakis, arguing that the 
majority failed to recognize the well-established distinction between an 
affirmative claim and a factual defense.86 “When a claim is within a tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, like the government’s claim for delay damages, the tribunal 
routinely has jurisdiction to consider defenses to the claim. This rule is not 
negated by any provision of the Contract Disputes Act.”87 Judge Newman 
reasoned that—by the time the case was before the Federal Circuit—Maropakis 
sought neither a modification of the contract nor damages nor additional 
compensation.88 Instead, Maropakis merely sought to defend against the 
government’s claim, and “[n]o rule or precedent holds that a contractor forfeits 
its right of defense if it does not file its own claim.”89 Judge Newman explained:
The right to defend against an adverse claim is not a matter of “jurisdiction,” nor of 
grace; it is a matter of right. The denial of that right, argued by the government on 
a theory of “jurisdiction” that was supported by the Court of Federal Claims and is 
now supported by this court, is contrary to the purposes of the CDA, contrary to 
precedent, and an affront to the principles upon which these courts were founded.90
Judge Newman’s articulate prose demonstrates that she found the distinction 
between a claim and a defense rather obvious and that simple logic supports 
the distinction.91 Focusing upon the demand and the relief available simplifies 
the analysis. A contractor’s claim for time extensions (based upon Government 
delay or interference with the contractor’s progress)—submitted to the 
CO92—both quantifies and demands additional payment for the extra time 
spent and additional work that the contractor completed on the contract, 
in addition to seeking interest on both the extra payment sought and any 
remaining balance on the contract withheld by the government.93 By contrast, 
a defense to a government claim for liquidated damages was not previously 
86 Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1334 (Newman, J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 1333.
88 Id. at 1332.
89 Id. at 1334.
90 Id. at 1334–35. See also infra Part II.C. (discussing the finding of a jurisdictional rule).
91 Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1334–35 (Newman, J., dissenting).
92 A decision by the CO is required for both contractor claims and government demands. 
A contractor claim demands a CO decision under the CDA. See CDA, 41 U.S.C. § 7103(f )
(5) (Supp. V 2011). A government claim is generally a demand for payment. Neither type 
of claim is a defense, but instead they are both a demand for a “sum certain.” See 48 C.F.R. 
§ 2.101 (2010) (defining the term “claim”).
93 See Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1334–35 (Newman, J., dissenting); Sun Eagle Corp. 
v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 465, 482 (1991); Pushkar & Ganderson, supra note 6, at 3–4.
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required to be submitted to the CO and, similarly, does not accrue interest.94 
As the moniker suggests, a defense serves only to deter the government 
from withholding payment due the contractor under the contract and from 
collecting any further damages that the government seeks.95 The purported 
distinction has a checkered history,96 but the basic parameters did not appear 
to be in question.
Prior decisions of both the [BCAs] and the COFC’s predecessor courts have discussed 
the differences between a contractor’s affirmative CDA claims . . . to combat a liquidated 
damages assessment versus a contractor’s defenses against an assessment through an attack 
of its factual underpinnings. The key to understanding this distinction is in the form of 
relief requested. An affirmative CDA claim is an attempt to modify or adjust the contract 
to counter the liquidated damages assessment (e.g., compensable time extensions as 
a result of government delays). A factual defense to a liquidated damages assessment 
merely serves to attack the assessment itself (e.g., the government’s assessment was 
incorrect because the delay was excused as a result of government delays). Plainly stated, 
a CDA claim seeks affirmative relief under the contract through a contract adjustment; a 
factual defense only attempts to reduce or eliminate the liquidated damages assessment.97
Professor Ralph Nash also agreed with Judge Newman and made no effort 
to hide his exasperation with the majority in Maropakis:
It is difficult to conceive of a more bizarre holding than this rule that if a defense 
looks like an affirmative claim, it can only be asserted if it meets the standard of being 
a proper CDA claim. . . . [N]othing in the CDA . . . would lead to this conclusion 
and it surely flies in the face of the congressional purpose of providing contractors a 
fair procedure for resolving disputes. We never had any problem with the holding in 
Ruhnau-Evans-Ruhnau Associates v. U.S., 3 Cl. Ct. 217 (1983), that precludes interest 
on a Government claim unless it is converted into a contractor claim. However, it is 
[a] far stretch to hold that a contractor cannot even assert a defense to a Government 
claim unless it is converted into a contractor claim.98
Similarly, Stanfield Johnson explained: “The CDA had plainly given the 
sovereign’s consent to Maropakis’ appeal from the final decision asserting 
the government claim, a right that should not have been emasculated by 
attributing an abnormal meaning to ‘defense.’ Even a strict construction 
requires a reasonable basis, consistent with the purpose of the waiver.”99 Yet 
94 See Sun Eagle, 23 Cl. Ct. at 482.
95 See Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1334–35 (Newman, J., dissenting); Sun Eagle, 23 Cl. Ct. 
at 482; Ruhnau-Evans-Ruhnau Assocs. v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 217, 218–19 (1983) 
(holding that though contractor successfully defended against the government’s claim for 
damages, the contractor was not entitled to interest because it never submitted a claim of 
its own); see also Pushkar & Ganderson, supra note 6, at 3–4.
96 See Pushkar & Ganderson, supra note 6, at 2–4.
97 Id. at 2–3 (underscore added).
98 Nash, A Weird Thought, supra note 6, at 135.
99 W. Stanfield Johnson, The Federal Circuit’s Great Dissenter and Her “National Policy 
of Fairness to Contractors”, 40 Pub. Cont. L.J. 275, 342 (2011) [hereinafter Johnson, The 
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despite what appears patently obvious to the government contracts bar, the 
distinction between a contractor’s affirmative claim and a factual defense 
was lost on the majority, resulting in “one of the court’s most formalistic 
decisions.”100 Judge Newman also found the decision unjust and unfair.101
Judge Newman found it wholly unnecessary for a contractor to submit a 
claim in order to defend against the government claim.102 First, she reasoned 
that the court’s jurisdiction solely depended on the government’s claim.103 
She noted that the court in Placeway “based jurisdiction on the government’s 
claim; a defense does not have a jurisdictional dimension.”104 Second, she 
rejected the majority’s finding that the contractor’s defense amounted to a 
claim for contract modification.105 “The routine defense that the government 
contributed to delay is a defense, not a contract modification. Failure to meet 
the CDA requirements for certification, naming a sum certain, requesting a 
final decision, or modifying the contract, does not preclude defending against 
the government’s claim.”106 Accordingly, Judge Newman saw neither a statutory 
nor a policy rationale for requiring the contractor to file a separate claim.107 
Her pleas for fairness to government contractors seem to have fallen on deaf 
Federal Circuit’s Great Dissenter]. Judge Newman’s dissent is just the latest example of her 
“unique judicial approach to government contracts cases.” Schooner, A Random Walk, supra 
note 6, at 1077. Labeling Judge Newman “The Federal Circuit’s Great Dissenter,” Stanfield 
Johnson recently explained how her general viewpoint in government contract cases differs 
from that of her colleagues:
At the core of Judge Newman’s dissenting jurisprudence is the premise that the sovereign 
as a contracting party should be accountable for its actions, subject only to limited 
exceptions not to be presumed, unnecessarily expanded, or imposed in a formalistic, 
doctrinaire way that ignores or masks the facts of government conduct. Where the facts 
justify it, contractors should be entitled to a “fair and just” remedy, and the Federal 
Circuit is there to make sure this happens.
Johnson, The Federal Circuit’s Great Dissenter, supra note 99, at 333. Johnson finds “[h]er 
jurisprudence . . . so consistent with the authorized history of the jurisdiction inherited from 
the Court of Claims, declaring the court as a nation’s ‘conscience,’ that one wonders why 
she appears a maverick among the judges of the Federal Circuit.” Id.; see also Schooner, A 
Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1079 (“Judge Newman proved true to form . . . dissenting in 
[Maropakis], expressing disapproval, if not exasperation, with the majority’s unwillingness 
to protect the interest of a government contractor.”).
100 Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1095, 1098.
101 Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 1332.
103 Id. at 1333.
104 Id. at 1333 n.2.
105 Id. at 1332.
106 Id. at 1334.
107 Id.
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ears as the Federal Circuit continues to depart from its intended role as the 
nation’s conscience in government contracts jurisprudence.108
B. The Formalist Trend Continues
Viewing Maropakis in the context of the Federal Circuit’s recent jurisprudence 
reflects the court’s ongoing shift toward formalism,109 which stands in stark 
contrast to the approach of its predecessor, the Court of Claims.110 Congress 
established the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982, replacing 
the appellate level of the Court of Claims and (somewhat as an afterthought) 
enshrining the court as the primary appellate court for government contract 
cases.111 Since then, the Federal Circuit has appeared intent on distinguishing 
itself from the Court of Claims, not just in name, but also in its view of its 
role.112
One potential cause of this changed perspective is that the Federal 
Circuit—unlike its predecessor—does not exclusively hear claims against the 
government.113 Therefore, the Federal Courts Improvement Act enabled a shift 
from a well-established specialty court to a far more generalized institution114:
In terms of Federal Circuit caseload, while the formal jurisdiction of the court is defined 
by subject matter (which itself is substantially varied), the kinds of issues dealt with 
by any particular judge of the court is a function of the luck of the draw in cases and, 
over time, will run a wide gamut of legal issues.115
Not only do Federal Circuit judges hear relatively few government contract cases 
each year, but they—as a group and individually—lack any pre-appointment 
108 Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1078–79.
109 Id. at 1069.
110 Id. at 1078–79. Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, the Court of Claims ex-
ercised jurisdiction over government contract cases (with divided jurisdiction between trial 
and appellate levels). Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement 
Act of 1982, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 543, 544 (2003).
111 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (FCIA), Pub. L. No. 97-164, sec. 127, 
§ 1295, 96 Stat. 25, 37–38 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The same statute 
created the U.S. Claims Court—now the COFC—to replace the trial level of the Court of 
Claims. Id. sec. 133, § 1491, 96 Stat. at 39–41. The court hears appeals of both protests (or 
disappointed offeror suits) and contract disputes.
112 Ralph C. Nash, The Government Contract Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 78 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 586, 587–88 (2010) [hereinafter Nash, Government Contract Decisions].
113 Id. at 588; see also Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1081.
114 See S. Jay Plager, The United States Court of Appeals, the Federal Circuit, and the Non-
Regional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 
853, 860 (1990).
115 Id. (footnote omitted).
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experience in the field.116 Prior to retiring, Chief Judge Michel acknowledged 
the court’s expertise vacuum in government contract law117:
Judge Michel urged the members of the Government contracts bar to consider seeking 
the nomination of persons with Government contracts expertise and experience as 
replacements for the Federal Circuit judges who would be retiring or taking senior 
status . . . . Judge Michel stated that the appointment of one or more individuals with 
such experience could go a long way towards raising the court’s understanding of the 
real-world effects of its decisions in the Government contracts area.118
As a result, the court is “not a specialized court in any meaningful sense of 
the word.”119 Like the COFC, the Federal Circuit is neither a specialty court 
nor a general court, but somewhere in the middle.120 By contrast, “the Court 
of Claims was marked by a jurisdiction dependent upon the provision of the 
particular remedy (monetary awards) for a particular harm (breach of contract) 
and upon the presence of a particular defendant (the United States).121 These 
differences in makeup and jurisdiction appear to have caused the Federal 
Circuit to distinguish itself from the Court of Claims.122
The trend has been difficult to watch. “The Court of Claims perceived 
itself as the conscience of the nation. That is to say, it believed that one of its 
major tasks, as the court where citizens could obtain redress for actions of the 
government, was to show those citizens that the government treated them 
fairly.”123 As the Federal Circuit has slowly drifted away from that view,124 it 
seems that, rather than elevating fairness to the citizen as its foremost priority, 
the court has adopted a strong deference toward the government, regardless of 
whether in the role of plaintiff or defendant.125 This shift was most explicitly 
confirmed by the congressionally established Acquisition Advisory Panel.126 The 
116 Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1070–71.
117 See id. at 1069.
118 Huffman, supra note 16; see also Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1069.
119 Plager, supra note 114, at 864 (citing Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Ar-
chitecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
603, 612 (1989)).
120 Steven L. Schooner, The Future: Scrutinizing the Empirical Case for the Court of Federal 
Claims, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 714, 719–20 (2003).
121 Judith Resnick, Of Courts, Agencies, and the Court of Federal Claims: Fortunately Outliv-
ing One’s Anomalous Character, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 798, 801 (2003).
122 Nash, Government Contract Decisions, supra note 112, at 588.
123 Id. at 587.
124 Id. at 588; see also Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1081.
125 Schooner, A Random Walk, supra note 6, at 1079.
126 Acquisition Advisory Panel, Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the United States Congress 84 (Jan. 
2007), available at https://www.acquisition.gov/comp/aap/finalaapreport.html.
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panel’s 2007 report articulated the premise that the “fundamental difference 
between government and commercial contracting is unequal treatment of the 
parties in the contracting process. The government enjoys certain contractual 
‘advantages’ by virtue of its status as the ‘sovereign’ resulting in benefits from 
the centuries-old, judicially created doctrine of sovereign or governmental 
immunity.”127 By contrast, “[t]he United States Supreme Court  .  .  .  has 
held for some 130 years that the same rules of contract interpretation and 
performance apply to both the government and contractors.”128 Unfortunately 
government contractors sustain harm from this ever-increasing deference to 
the government.129
The Federal Circuit also appears to have adopted a preference for rigid rules 
in the area of government procurement.130 “There seems to be a belief that 
there are no shades of gray in contracting—that the issues are either black or 
white. The problem is that the contracting process—in both commercial and 
government contracts—is not that way.”131 The Federal Circuit seems to have 
abandoned the Court of Claims’s method of considering all relevant evidence 
in the case in favor of this formalistic approach.132
Where the Federal Circuit once resolved issues based upon “all the facts and 
circumstances,” it now more often applies a discrete list of factors. Where the court 
once employed standards, it now employs rules. Where the court once had dense rules, 
they have become leaner. In short, the Federal Circuit has embraced an increasingly 
formal jurisprudence.133
Instead of looking to the parties’ intent in drafting the contract, the court 
rigidly adheres to the language of the contract without reference to context.134 
This proves surprisingly problematic. “Armed with dictionaries and thesauruses, 
a clever attorney can propound interpretations that never occurred to the 
parties at the time they entered into the contract.”135
127 Id.
128 Id. at 85.
129 Schooner, Postscript, supra note 12, at 18.
130 Nash, Government Contract Decisions, supra note 112, at 612; Schooner, A Random 
Walk, supra note 6, at 1081; John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 Am. U. 
L. Rev. 771, 773–75 (2003) (discussing “formalism” of the Federal Circuit in the context 
of patents).
131 Nash, Government Contract Decisions, supra note 112, at 612.
132 Id. at 592.
133 Thomas, supra note 130, at 773–74 (footnotes omitted).
134 Nash, Government Contract Decisions, supra note 112, at 592–93.
135 Id. at 593. Ironically, even the dictionaries contradict the court’s finding in Maropakis.
Webster’s Dictionary defines “defense” as “a denial, answer, or plea” or “the collected 
facts and method adopted by a defendant to protect and defend against a plaintiff’s 
action”—with no mention of “claim.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “defense” as a 
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The preference for such strict construction takes “discretion away from the 
judges on the Court of Federal Claims and the boards of contract appeals to 
assess the facts fully and seek a fair outcome.”136 In the Maropakis decision, 
both the court’s strict adherence to rigid rules and its deference to the sovereign 
make a meaningful appearance.137
C. The Contract Disputes Act: No Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings
Maropakis also appears sharply at odds with both the statutory language and 
purpose of the CDA.138 Congress designed the CDA to streamline the dispute 
resolution process for government contracts, intending to create an efficient 
process through which contractor and government claims could be resolved.139 
Congress aspired to reduce litigation by encouraging dispute resolution 
through negotiation prior to litigation; provide different forums suitable for 
different types of disputes; and create a fair and equitable system of dispute 
resolution for both government contractors and government agencies.140 In 
short, Congress trumpeted that the CDA was enacted “to ‘streamline contract 
disputes’ and ‘clarify what [were then] confusing procedures.’”141 Congress 
perceived the statutory scheme as a way to “release[] contractors from the 
limited confines of administrative law by providing direct access to a judicial 
forum,” which in turn “eliminated procedural delays and returned the focus 
of the disputes process to the merits of claims.”142
To encourage resolution prior to litigation, the CDA imposes specific 
jurisdictional prerequisites before the government or a contractor may initiate 
“defendant’s stated reason why the plaintiff . . . has no valid case—also with no mention 
of “claim” (in more than two pages of additional definitions). The CDA had plainly 
given the sovereign’s consent to Maropakis’ appeal from the final decision asserting 
the government claim, a right that should not have been emasculated by attributing 
an abnormal meaning to “defense.” Even a strict construction requires a reasonable 
basis, consistent with the purpose of the waiver.
Johnson, The Federal Circuit’s Great Dissenter, supra note 102, at 342 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 326 (11th ed. 2003), and Black’s 
Law Dictionary 482–85 (9th ed. 2009)).
136 Nash, Government Contract Decisions, supra note 112, at 613.
137 See supra Part I.
138 See CDA, 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7109 (Supp. V 2011); S. Rep. No. 95-1118, pt. 1, at 
1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5235.
139 Johnson, A Retrospective on the CDA, supra note 9, at 570.
140 Id.
141 Id. (quoting 124 Cong. Rec. 36,264 (1978) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum)).
142 Clarence Kipps et al., The Contract Disputes Act: Solid Foundation, Magnificent System, 
28 Pub. Cont. L.J. 585, 591 (1999).
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a suit in the COFC or the BCAs.143 First, the Act requires that a contractor 
submit all claims against the government to the CO.144 Second, all claims 
must be in writing.145 Third, if their claims (currently) exceed $100,000, the 
contractor must certify that, among other things, the claims are made in good 
faith and are accurate to the best of the contractor’s knowledge.146 Fourth, 
the contractor must receive a final decision from the CO on the claim.147 
Only after fulfilling these requirements may the contractor initiate litigation 
with regard to its claim before either an agency board148 or the COFC.149 If 
a contractor fails to fulfill these jurisdictional mandates, the court and the 
boards lack subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.150
Although the CDA regime essentially “revolves around the ‘claim,’”151 the 
CDA does not define “claim,”152 and the meaning of the term remains rather 
143 CDA, 41 U.S.C. § 7104(a), (b)(1). One of the goals of the CDA was to provide an 
election of forum or concurrent alternative forums to which a contractor could appeal an 
adverse decision by a CO. S. Rep. No. 95-1118, pt. 1, at 1. See generally Michael J. Schaen-
gold & Robert S. Brams, Choice of Forum for Government Contract Claims: Court of Federal 
Claims vs. Board of Contract Appeals, 17 Fed. Cir. B.J. 279 (2008) [hereinafter Schaengold, 
Choice of Forum 2008]; Thomas C. Wheeler, Let’s Make the Choice of Forum Meaningful, 
28 Pub. Cont. L.J. 655 (1999); Michael J. Schaengold, Robert S. Brams & Christopher 
Lerner, Choice of Forum for Contract Claims: Court vs. Board, 3 Fed. Cir. B.J. 35 (1993).
144 CDA, 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(1); see also 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2010). The CO oversees the 
contract and generally has authority to bind the government in contract, make changes to the 
contract, and rule on contract claims. John S. Pachter, The Incredible Shrinking Contracting 
Officer, 39 Pub. Cont. L.J. 705, 709–10 (2010).
145 CDA, 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(2).
146 Id. § 7103(b).
147 Id. § 7104. In the alternative, failure by the CO to issue a decision within a prescribed 
period may be deemed to be a final decision, and the contractor may then file an appeal. 
Id. § 7103(f )(5).
148 Examples of agency boards include the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals 
and the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. Id. § 7105.
149 Id. § 7104(a), (b)(1).
150 England v. Swanson Grp., Inc., 353 F.3d 1375, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also 
James M. Ellett Constr. Co. v. United States, 93 F.3d 1537, 1541–42 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating 
that a contractor must properly submit a claim and receive a decision from the CO before 
a reviewing court will have jurisdiction over a claim).
151 Johnson, A Retrospective on the CDA, supra note 9, at 569.
152 CDA, 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7103. The CDA does define other terms such as “executive 
agency,” “contractor,” and “misrepresentation of fact.” Id. § 7101.
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unclear.153 The Federal Circuit has looked to the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(“FAR”) for guidance.154 The FAR defines a claim as:
a written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a 
matter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation 
of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to the contract  .  .  .  . A 
voucher, invoice, or other routine request for payment that is not in dispute when 
submitted is not a claim.155
While the CDA does not require a contractor to submit a claim in a certain 
form or use particular language, the claim must contain “a clear and unequivocal 
statement that gives the contracting officer adequate notice of the basis and 
amount of the claim.”156 Therefore, a contractor must be sure that its “claim” 
meets the above definition and that the CO issues a final decision on that 
claim before filing an appeal to the BCAs or the COFC.157
In contrast to a contractor claim, when the government asserts a claim (or, 
in effect, makes a formal demand for payment), a contractor may properly 
appeal a final decision on the government’s claim to the BCAs or the COFC 
without submitting a claim of any type to the CO.158 Not surprisingly, neither 
the CDA nor the FAR require a contractor to submit a claim outlining its 
affirmative defenses to a government claim.159 While the language of the Act 
seems clear, courts and boards nonetheless disagree on the proper application of 
these procedures in the case of a contractor’s defense to a government claim.160
Regrettably, the majority opinion in Maropakis contravenes the legislative 
intent of the CDA to insure fair and equitable treatment of both contractors 
and the government.161 Whereas Congress enacted the CDA “to ‘streamline 
153 Johnson, A Retrospective on the CDA, supra note 9, at 569 (stating that “[t]wo decades 
later, after repeatedly revisiting the subject in litigation, regulation, and statutory amendment, 
we are still not completely certain what ‘claim’ means”).
154 Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
155 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2000).
156 Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Contract Cleaning Maint., 
Inc. v. United States, 811 F.2d 586, 592 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
157 James M. Ellett Constr. Co. v. United States, 93 F.3d 1537, 1543–44 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
158 CDA, 41 U.S.C. §§ 7103(a), (e) (contents of decision), 7104(a), (b)(1) (Supp. V 
2011); Garrett v. Gen. Elec. Co., 987 F.2d 747, 749 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
159 See CDA, §§ 7103(a), 7104(a), 7104(b)(1); 48 C.F.R. § 52.211-11 (2000) (stating that 
if the contract makes a successful defense it will not be charged with liquidated damages).
160 See, e.g., Kemron Envtl. Servs. Corp., ASBCA No. 51536, 00-1 BCA ¶ 30,664 (1999); 
Sun Eagle Corp. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 465, 479–82 (1991); Elgin Builders, Inc. v. 
United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 40, 44 (1986).
161 S. Rep. No. 95-1118, pt. 1, at 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5235; 
see Nash, A Weird Thought, supra note 6.
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contract disputes’ and ‘clarify  .  .  .  confusing procedures,’”162 Maropakis 
complicates and confuses the disputes process. Maropakis cautions contractors 
to anticipate claims by the government and expend resources to resolve 
previously non-existent jurisdictional issues or be left helpless to defend against 
sizable liquidated damages claims brought by the government.163 Thus, instead 
of eliminating procedural delays and returning the focus to the merits of a 
case,164 Maropakis creates additional procedural delays and forces contractors 
to meticulously focus on counter-intuitive procedural requirements now 
complicating their disputes.165
The opinion also seems contrary to the role of the agency boards and the 
COFC to equitably and efficiently resolve disputes between contractors and 
the government.166 Instead of facilitating fair and efficient outcomes, the 
Maropakis majority enables and even encourages the government to drag 
out expensive litigation and block recovery and resolution on jurisdictional 
grounds.167 The decision has and will likely continue to result in contractors 
bringing more claims simply to preserve their right to defend against government 
claims—even where it is unnecessary to do so under Maropakis or would have 
been unnecessary but for Maropakis.168 Maropakis is not the first instance of 
unnecessarily rigid interpretation of the CDA.169 Just as in prior decisions that 
have further complicated the CDA process, here “[t]he plans of its framers, if 
well laid, have plainly gone awry because of regulations and decisions focusing 
on ‘definitional structures’ at odds with the CDA’s basic purposes.”170
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit in Maropakis seemingly disregarded the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions warning lower courts against imposing 
162 Johnson, A Retrospective on the CDA, supra note 9, at 569–70 (quoting 124 Cong. 
Rec. 36,264 (1978) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum)).
163 See Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting); 
Sun Eagle, 23 Cl. Ct. at 476.
164 Kipps et al., supra note 142, at 591.
165 Schooner, Postscript, supra note 12, at 21; see Maropakis  II, 609 F.3d at 1334–35 
(Newman. J., dissenting).
166 See S. Rep. No. 95-1118, pt. 1, at 1; Wheeler, supra note 143, at 656 (describing 
how procedures in the BCAs have become complicated in contravention of the purpose 
and mandate of the CDA).
167 See Sun Eagle, 23 Cl. Ct. at 476 (“The amount of litigation engendered by the terms 
or requirements of the CDA relating to jurisdiction is staggering, and the results have not 
been satisfactory at both the trial and appellate levels; hence, litigation continues.”); see also 
Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1334–35 (Newman, J., dissenting).
168 See Pushkar & Ganderson, supra note 6, at 6.
169 See Johnson, A Retrospective on the CDA, supra note 9, at 574–77 (reviewing cases 
analyzing the meaning of “claim”).
170 Id. at 584.
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jurisdictional bars based on claim-processing rules in the absence of a 
clear congressional mandate.171 “Our recent cases evince a marked desire to 
curtail . . . ‘drive-by jurisdictional rulings,’ which too easily can miss the ‘critical 
differences’ between true jurisdictional conditions and nonjurisdictional 
limitations on causes of action.’”172 The Court specifically stated that, in the 
case of claim-processing rules, courts should refrain from labeling a rule as 
jurisdictional absent a clear congressional mandate to do so.173 “Among the 
types of rules that should not be described as jurisdictional are what we have 
called ‘claim-processing rules.’ These are rules that seek to promote the orderly 
progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps 
at certain specified times.”174
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall 
count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be 
left to wrestle with the issue. But when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation 
on coverage as jurisdictional, court should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional 
in character.175
The Court explained that because a jurisdictional rule has drastic consequences, 
harm results if a court erroneously labels a rule as jurisdictional.176 “Jurisdictional 
rules may also result in the waste of judicial resources and may unfairly 
prejudice litigants.”177
In Maropakis, the Federal Circuit created a jurisdictional bar that lacks an 
obvious basis in the CDA, much less a clear congressional label.178 The CDA 
does not contain statutory language addressing civil procedure, nor does the 
statute suggest that a court is without jurisdiction to hear affirmative defenses 
that have not first been filed as claims before the CO.179 As the Supreme Court 
171 Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011) (unanimous decision (with 
Justice Kagan not participating)) (reversing an en banc decision of the Federal Circuit); 
Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1244 (2010); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 
U.S. 500, 514–16 (2006); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648–49 (2012); 
Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 Rev. Litig. 
313, 317–318 (2012).
172 Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1244 (citations and brackets omitted); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. 
at 511.
173 See Henderson, 131 S.Ct. at 1203.
174 Id.
175 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515–16 (citation omitted).
176 Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202 (giving examples such as a litigant’s ability to raise the 
issue of subject matter jurisdiction after losing a trial and being able to get the case dismissed 
on the jurisdictional ground after the trial is over).
177 Id. at 1202.
178 See Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
179 See supra Part II. A.
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observed, the result of creating such a jurisdictional hurdle wastes judicial 
resources and unfairly prejudices litigants.180
D. Maropakis Contradicts Fundamental Practices and Rules of 
Civil Procedure
The majority’s decision in Maropakis also contradicts commonly understood 
and generally accepted principles of civil procedure, which distinguish 
affirmative defenses from claims.181 “Affirmative defenses are the way defendant 
sets forth defenses that cannot be conveyed by simply admitting or denying the 
factual allegations of the complaint. An affirmative defense generally involves 
the assertion of matter extraneous to plaintiff’s claims that would bar or limit 
recovery . . . .”182 An affirmative defense must be pled in the opposing party’s 
answer.183 More specifically, defenses to liquidated damages are typically pled 
as affirmative defenses under state common law.184
Additionally, affirmative defenses are distinct from counterclaims.185 
“Unlike a defense, which simply denies plaintiff’s right to recover under the 
theories alleged, a counterclaim is an affirmative demand for something from 
plaintiff.”186 “Since [a counterclaim and cross-claim] are not portions of an 
answer but constitute a new complaint against the parties to whom they are 
directed, counterclaims and cross-claims are treated quite differently than are 
affirmative defenses.”187
180 Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202.
181 Jack H. Friedenthal, et al., Civil Procedure 293 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that “the 
distinction between counterclaims and cross-claims and affirmative defenses is an important 
one”).
182 1 Business and Commercial Litigation in Federal Courts 679 (Robert L. Haig, 
ed., 3d ed. 2011).
183 Friedenthal, supra note 185, at 290.
184 See, e.g., J.M. Beeson Co. v. Sartori, 553 So.2d 180, 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) 
(stating that “where liquidated damages are attacked, it is the burden of the defendant to 
raise the excessiveness of the damages as an affirmative defense” (citing C.T. McCormick, 
Handbook on the Law of Damages 622–23 (1977)); Tex. All Risk Gen. Agency, Inc. v. 
Apex Lloyds Ins. Co., No. 10-10-00017, 2010 WL 4572738, at *5 (Tex. App. Nov. 10, 2010) 
(stating that “an assertion that a liquidated damages provision is a penalty is an affirmative 
defense that a defendant has the burden of pleading and proving”).
185 Friedenthal, supra note 185, at 292–93.
186 Haig, supra note 186, at 697.
187 Friedenthal, supra note 185, at 292–93 (stating that, as an example, counterclaims 
and cross-claims must be answered by reply pleading, but usually affirmative defenses will 
be taken as denied without further pleading by the plaintiff).
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From a simplistic perspective, jurisdiction generally is not based on defenses, 
but is rather based on the original claim.188 That is why “[a] defense that raises 
a federal question is inadequate to confer federal jurisdiction.”189 Likewise, 
where a court has jurisdiction to hear a claim, it also enjoys jurisdiction over 
the factual defenses to the claim.190
The majority’s reasoning in Maropakis clearly deviates from these basic 
principles of civil procedure. The court took an affirmative defense that 
intended to present facts to bar or limit the government’s recovery and asserted 
that it was a “claim” for a sum certain.191 Furthermore, it erroneously held 
that the affirmative defense needed its own jurisdictional grounds, despite the 
court’s admission that it had jurisdiction over the government’s claim.192 Such 
a peculiar departure from civil procedure norms might be understandable if 
the statutory scheme required such an approach. As discussed above, however, 
no such mandate derives from the CDA’s language or Congress’s intent in 
enacting the CDA.193
E. A Useful Analogy
Maropakis’s flawed reasoning and contradiction of general principles of civil 
procedure is illustrated through analogy to a similar statutory scheme—one 
with which the Federal Circuit has more than a passing familiarity.194 Congress 
enacted FIRREA to address the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s.195 FIRREA 
188 See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986).
189 Id. (citing Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908)).
190 See Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), 8(c)(1) (“Affirmative Defenses”) (discussed in the context 
of “responding to a pleading”). Note that Rule 8(c)(2) provides that“[i]f a party mistakenly 
designates a defense as a counterclaim, or a counterclaim as a defense, the court must, if 
justice requires, treat the pleading as though it were correctly designated.” Rule 13, on the 
other hand, deals with “counterclaims” and “crossclaims.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)–(e) (coun-
terclaims), (g) (crossclaims).
191 Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1327.
192 See id. at 1330–32.
193 See id. at 1334–35 (Newman, J., dissenting).
194 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). Granted, it ap-
pears that neither the contractor nor the government’s counsel referenced any of these cases 
in their appellate briefs.
195 The Federal Circuit and the government contracts bar, of course, are both familiar 
with FIRREA and its after-effects. Alan R. Burch, Purchasing the Right to Govern: WINSTAR 
and the Need to Reconceptualize the Law of Regulatory Agreements, 88 Ky. L.J. 245 (2000); 
John Cibinic, Jr., Retroactive Legislation and Regulations and Federal Government Contracts, 
51 Ala. L. Rev. 963 (2000); Rodger D. Citron, Lessons Learned From the Damages Decisions 
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created the Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”) under the exclusive 
management of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”).196 
Under FIRREA, the (then RTC or, now) FDIC can be appointed as receiver 
of a failed depository institution and assume responsibility for managing its 
assets and liabilities in an efficient manner.197 Under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3), 
the receiver can decide claims against the failed institution subject to de novo 
review in the district courts.198 FIRREA contains a jurisdictional bar similar 
to that of the CDA, Section 1821(d)(13)(D):
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no court shall have jurisdiction over –
(i) any claim or action for payment from, or any action seeking a determination of rights 
with respect to, the assets of any depository institution for which the Corporation[199] 
has been appointed receiver, including assets which the Corporation may acquire from 
itself as such receiver; or
(ii) any claim relating to any act or omission of such institution or the Corporation 
as receiver.200
The exception refers to § 1821(d), which provides for de novo review by 
the district courts of the receiver’s decisions concerning claims against the 
Following United States v. WINSTAR Corp., 32 Pub. Cont. L.J. 1 (2002); David Dana & 
Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473 (1999); 
Stanley I. Langbein, The Thrift Crisis and the Constitution, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 159 
(1996); Michael P. Malloy, When You Wish Upon WINSTAR: Contract Analysis and the Future 
of Regulatory Action, 42 St. Louis U. L.J. 409 (1998); Joshua I. Schwartz, The Status of the 
Sovereign Acts and Unmistakability Doctrines in the Wake of WINSTAR: An Interim Report, 
51 Ala. L. Rev. 1177 (2000); Richard E. Speidel, Contract Excuse Doctrine and Retrospec-
tive Legislation: The WINSTAR Case, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 795 (2001); Jerry Stouck & David 
R. Lipson, United States v. WINSTAR Corp.: Affirming the Application of Private Contract 
Law Principles to the Federal Government, 6 Fed. Cir. B.J. 315 (1996);Gerard Wimberly & 
Kristin Amerling, The Sovereign Acts Doctrine After WINSTAR, 6 Fed. Cir. B.J. 127 (1996).
196 Anthony C. Providdenti, Jr., Playing with FIRREA, Not Getting Burned: Statutory 
Overview of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 59 
Fordham L. Rev. S323, S337 (1991).
197 See id.; see also Tri-State Hotels, Inc. v. FDIC, 79 F.3d 707, 710 (8th Cir. 1996); Nat’l 
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City Sav., F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 376 (3d Cir. 1994) (RTC as receiver). 
The RTC no longer exists, and the FDIC now wields this power. See, e.g., Lee Davison, The 
Resolution Trust Corporation and Congress, 1989-1993, PART II: 1991-1993, FDIC Banking 
Rev. (Apr. 27, 2007), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2007apr/
article1/ (“[C]ongressional oversight of the RTC continued until the agency closed in 1995, 
but the legislative story ends with the passage of the 1993 Completion Act—the last signifi-
cant legislative activity involving the RTC.”).
198 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)–(6) (2006).
199 “Corporation” refers to the RTC.
200 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D).
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failed institution.201 The courts have thus “characterized the jurisdictional 
restriction  .  .  .  as a statutory exhaustion requirement: in order to obtain 
jurisdiction to bring a claim in federal court, one must exhaust administrative 
remedies by submitting the claim to the receiver in accordance with the 
administrative scheme for adjudicating claims detailed in [the statute].”202
FIRREA’s jurisdictional bar blocks any type of claim, including a 
determination of rights,203 and it extends to all claimants, whether creditors, 
debtors or others.204 In addition to paying creditors, the receiver of the failed 
institution may also seek monetary recovery from the institution’s debtors.205 
Under this regime, a number of circuit courts confronted an issue that mirrored 
Maropakis: whether the jurisdictional bar applied to the debtors’ affirmative 
defenses to claims brought against them by the receivers.206 These circuits, 
unlike the Federal Circuit in Maropakis, accurately distinguished a claim 
from an affirmative defense and allowed the debtors to defend themselves 
against monetary claims.207
1. Similarities Between the FIRREA Cases and Maropakis
The similarities between the FIRREA scenario and the situation in Maropakis 
are striking. First, the receiver in these cases has presented a claim for monetary 
relief against a debtor based on a contract under which the debtor agreed to 
pay a certain amount of money.208 Similarly, in Maropakis, the government 
claimed monetary relief from the contractor based on a contract under which 
the contractor agreed to pay a certain amount in liquidated damages for each 
day of delay.209 Second, under the exhaustion requirement in FIRREA, claims 
had to be submitted to the receiver—the party against whom the claims were 
asserted.210 Likewise, under the CDA, claims are submitted to the CO—a 
representative of the government against whom the claims are asserted.211 
201 Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 383.
202 Id. at 383 (citations omitted); see also Tri-State, 79 F.3d at 715 n.12 (stating in dicta 
that the administrative claims procedure and the jurisdictional bar have concurrent scope).
203 Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 393.
204 Tri-State, 79 F.3d at 714 (holding that the jurisdictional bar applies to debtors as well 
as creditors).
205 Id.
206 See, e.g., Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 383.
207 See, e.g., id. at 394; see also infra note 221 (collecting circuit court cases).
208 See, e.g., Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 380.
209 Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
210 FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (2006).
211 CDA, 41 U.S.C. § 7103 (Supp. V 2011).
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Third, the jurisdictional bar is just as broad—if not broader—under FIRREA 
as under the CDA.212
[Section 1821(d)(13)(D) of FIRREA] bars jurisdiction over four categories of actions: 
(1) claims for payment from assets of any depository institution for which the RTC 
has been appointed receiver; (2) actions for payment from assets of such depository 
institution; (3) actions seeking a determination of rights with respect to assets of 
such depository institution; and (4) a claim relating to any act or omission of such 
institution or the RTC as receiver.213
As noted above, the CDA requires that any claim against the government 
relating to a government contract be submitted to the CO before it is 
adjudicated in the COFC or the BCAs.214 Therefore, the courts addressing 
affirmative defenses under FIRREA faced a strikingly similar issue to that 
presented to the Federal Circuit in Maropakis.215
2. Circuit Courts Distinguish a Claim and Affirmative Defense 
under FIRREA
When the district courts first addressed the issue of affirmative defenses, 
there was some disagreement as to whether these defenses were subject to 
FIRREA’s jurisdictional bar.216 Once the issue reached the federal appellate 
courts, however, the courts distinguished between a claim and an affirmative 
defense and held that the latter were not barred by § 1821(d).217 The Third 
Circuit stated that “it is plain enough that a defense or an affirmative defense is 
neither an ‘action’ nor a ‘claim,’ but rather is a response to an action or a claim, 
212 Compare Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 393 (describing the jurisdictional bars of FIRREA) 
with England v. Swanson Grp., Inc., 353 F.3d 1375, 1379 (describing the jurisdictional bar 
of the CDA).
213 Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 393.
214 CDA, 41 U.S.C. §§ 7103, 7104; see also supra Part II.C.
215 See Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
216 See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Midwest Fed. Sav. Bank, 36 F.3d 785, 792 (9th Cir. 
1993) (discussing the disagreement among the district courts).
217 See, e.g., Am. First Fed., Inc. v. Lake Forest Park, Inc., 198 F.3d 1259, 1264 (11th 
Cir. 1999) (following all three circuit courts that had addressed the issue and holding that 
affirmative defenses are not barred under § 1821(d)); Tri-State Hotels, Inc. v. FDIC, 79 
F.3d 707, 715 n.13 (8th Cir. 1996); Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 394; Resolution Trust Corp. 
v. Love, 36 F.3d 972, 978 (10th Cir. 1994); cf. Midwest Fed. Sav. Bank, 36 F.3d at 792–93 
(allowing affirmative defense of mutual mistake where the issue could not have been asserted 
in an affirmative claim through the administrative process); see also Jacobs v. PT Holdings, 
Inc., No. 8:11-CV-106, 2012 WL 458418, at *8 n.7 (D. Neb. Feb. 13, 2012) (collecting 
circuit court cases that distinguish between a claim and a defense in connection with FIR-
REA’s jurisdictional bar). The circuit courts clarified that only true affirmative defenses—as 
opposed to counterclaims—could proceed without meeting the exhaustion requirement. 
Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 394.
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and that therefore defenses and affirmative defenses do not fall under any of 
the . . . four categories of actions” placed beyond the courts’ jurisdiction.218
The circuit courts also reasoned that barring affirmative defenses would 
not serve the purpose behind FIRREA219:
In barring declaratory judgment actions, “Congress apparently . . . determined that 
the societal benefits resulting from the right to bring . . . declaratory judgment actions, 
are outweighed by the societal benefits resulting from the RTC being able to avoid 
costly and perhaps unnecessary litigation.” However, when the FDIC has completed 
its administrative review, and has chosen a judicial forum in which to prosecute its 
rights, the policy of avoiding unnecessary litigation is no longer applicable, and the 
party’s Due Process rights to defend the claims in the FDIC’s lawsuit become paramount.220
Expanding on the due process concerns, the Third Circuit stated that if 
FIRREA’s jurisdictional bar were read to prohibit a party from presenting 
affirmative defenses, it would violate the Due Process Clause221:
If parties were barred from presenting defenses and affirmative defenses to claims which 
have been filed against them, they would not only be unconstitutionally deprived of 
their opportunity to be heard, but they would invariably lose on the merits of the claims 
brought against them. Such a serious deprivation of property without due process of 
law cannot be countenanced in our constitutional system.222
Again pointing to the statute, the Tenth Circuit concluded that if Congress 
had wanted to bar affirmative defenses, it would have done so explicitly223:
Significantly, the statute never uses the term “defense”, “affirmative defense” or “potential 
affirmative defense” . . . . [I]f Congress had intended “to remove from the jurisdiction 
of the courts any and all actions, claims or defenses which might diminish the assets 
of any depository institution . . . or [which might] diminish or defeat any claims of 
the Corporation in any capacity, it would [have] been simple to so provide.” But 
Congress did not so provide.224
From a practical standpoint, the courts found that “such a literal application 
of the statute . . . would lead to the patently absurd consequence of requiring 
presentment and proof to the RTC of all potential affirmative defenses that 
might be asserted in response to unknown and unasserted claims or actions 
218 Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 393; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D); Tri-State, 79 F.3d 
at 715.
219 See Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 395; see also Tri-State, 79 F.3d at 715 n.13.
220 Tri-State, 79 F.3d at 715 n.13 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted) (citing Nat’l Union, F.3d at 388, 394 ).
221 Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 394.
222 Id.
223 See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Love, 36 F.3d 972, 977–78 (10th Cir. 1994).
224 Id. (third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting RTC 
v. Conner, 817 F. Supp. 98, 100 (W.D. Okla. 1993)).
Confusing Contractors’ Rights to Raise Affirmative Defenses 713
by the RTC.”225 Maropakis demonstrates the wisdom of the Tenth Circuit’s 
analysis: to the extent that Congress did not explicitly mandate contractor 
claims submission as a jurisdictional predicate to raising an affirmative defense 
to a government claim, Maropakis leads to a “patently absurd consequence.”226
The Third Circuit’s National Union decision was one of the first circuit 
court cases to address this issue and squarely presented the court with the task 
of distinguishing a claim from an affirmative defense.227 The failed institution 
had policies with two insurance companies prior to its failure.228 The insurance 
companies filed a declaratory judgment action in the district court, asserting 
the right to rescind the insurance policies issued to the failed institution.229 
In response, the receiver filed a counterclaim to collect under the insurance 
policies on behalf of the failed institution and filed a motion to dismiss 
the insurance companies’ claims for failure to exhaust their administrative 
remedies.230 The district court granted the motion to dismiss and also held 
that the insurance companies were likewise barred from raising the argument 
of rescission as an affirmative defense to the receiver’s counterclaim.231 The 
Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.232 The court held that the 
insurance companies’ declaratory judgment claim was barred for failure to 
exhaust its administrative remedies;233 but the Third Circuit concluded that 
the companies could raise the same argument related to the right to rescind 
in an affirmative defense to the receiver’s counterclaim.234
3. Analogizing the FIRREA Cases
The Federal Circuit, in Maropakis, should have followed the circuit 
courts’ reasoning in the FIRREA cases. First, the Federal Circuit should 
have distinguished between a claim and an affirmative defense. Second, the 
court should have considered the due process concerns implicated when it 
stripped Maropakis of its ability to defend itself. Third, the court should 
have recognized that once the government had “completed its administrative 
review, and ha[d identified] a judicial forum in which to prosecute its rights, 
the policy of avoiding unnecessary litigation is no longer applicable, and the 
225 Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 395 (quoting Conner, 817 F. Supp. at 102) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
226 See Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
227 Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 380.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 381.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 395.
233 Id. at 392.
234 Id.
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party’s Due Process rights to defend the claims in the . . . lawsuit become 
paramount.”235 Fourth, the Federal Circuit should recognize that its decision 
produces the “patently absurd consequence of requiring presentment and 
proof to the [government] of all potential affirmative defenses that might 
be asserted in response to unknown and unasserted claims or actions by 
the [government].”236 Fifth, the court should have recognized that the CDA 
“never uses the term ‘defense’, ‘affirmative defense’ or ‘potential affirmative 
defense’ . . . [;] if Congress had intended ‘to remove from the jurisdiction of 
the courts any and all actions, claims or defenses . . . it would [have] been 
simple to so provide.’ But Congress did not so provide.”237 Finally, even if the 
Federal Circuit prefers to eschew commonly accepted practices and procedures 
in government contract disputes in favor of a more formalistic (or generalist) 
approach, the most compelling precedent in an analogous setting (outside of 
government contracts, and outside of the Federal Circuit) also favored the 
status quo (that there are no jurisdictional prerequisites to raising affirmative 
defenses).
F. Inefficiencies and Uncertainty: Feared and Realized
Following the Maropakis decision in 2010, the contractor community was 
troubled by how the ruling might change and impede the contract disputes 
process.238 At the very least, a contractor appealing a liquidated damages 
assessment that resulted in an offset of the contract amount must submit 
a claim for time extensions before raising the defense that the government 
caused the delays.239 The majority, however, gave no clear indication of the 
decision’s limitations.240 It remains unclear whether the reasoning could or 
would be applied to other defenses, not only against liquidated damages, 
but also related to other government claims.241 As a result, the only way for 
contractors to ensure that their affirmative defenses are preserved is to anticipate 
235 Tri-State Hotels, Inc. v. FDIC, 79 F.3d 707, 715 n.13 (citing Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d 
at 394).
236 Nat’l Union, 28 F.3d at 395 (quoting RTC v. Conner, 817 F. Supp. 98, 102 (W.D. 
Okla. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
237 RTC v. Love, 36 F.3d 972, 977–78 (10th Cir. 1994) (final alteration in original) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Conner, 817 F. Supp. at 100).
238 See Pushkar & Ganderson, supra note 6, at 6; see also Nash, A Weird Thought, supra 
note 6; Government Contractors Must Now Assert Some Defenses as Affirmative Claims Or 
Lose Them, Hunton & Williams LLP, 3 (July 2010), available at http://www.hunton.com/ 
(follow “News & Events” hyperlink; then search for keyword “Government Contractors”) 
[hereinafter “Hunton & Williams”].
239 See Pushkar & Ganderson, supra note 6, at 6.
240 See id. at 8–9.
241 Id.
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all possible defenses and file affirmative claims with the CO setting forth such 
defenses. Consequently, it seemed unavoidable that Maropakis would generate 
an increase in claims, costing both the contractor and the government time 
and money.242 It did not take long for these fears to be realized.243 Although 
the initial cases have percolated up through the COFC, no clarity appears 
forthcoming.244
1. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States
In Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States,245 a COFC judge was presented 
with the issue of whether the court had jurisdiction over a contractor’s 
affirmative defenses when the contractor did, in fact, submit a separate claim 
for its affirmative defenses, but only after the litigation had commenced.246 
Sikorsky’s Corporate Administrative Contracting Officer (CACO)247 issued 
a final decision, claiming about $80 million against Sikorsky as a result of its 
cost allocation practices on various contracts for aircraft and spare parts.248 
Sikorsky challenged the determination by filing a complaint in the COFC in 
December of 2009, alleging various defenses to the government’s assessment.249 
After learning of the Maropakis decision, “out of an abundance of caution,” 
Sikorsky submitted a second claim to its contacting officer reasserting its 
affirmative defenses.250 The CO rejected the claim, stating that he lacked 
authority to render a decision because the matter was already in litigation 
before the COFC.251 Sikorsky, taking this as a denial, filed a second complaint 
with the COFC asserting its affirmative defenses; the government moved to 
dismiss this second complaint.252 The court, in addressing the government’s 
motion, bemoaned the convoluted process in “what was already an abstruse 
case.”253
The government asserted that Maropakis had no bearing on its motion.254 
It argued that the CO lost his authority to rule on Sikorsky’s claim once the 
242 Cf. id.; Hunton & Williams, supra note 238, at 3.
243 See Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 38 (2011).
244 See, e.g., id.; see also Structural Concepts, Inc. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 84 (2012).
245 102 Fed. Cl. 38 (2011).
246 Id. at 40–41.
247 See generally 48 C.F.R. § 42.6 (2011).




252 Id. at 44–45.
253 Id. at 44.
254 Id. at 47.
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matter entered litigation before the COFC.255 The government asserted that 28 
U.S.C. § 516, which gives the Attorney General and the DOJ sole authority 
to litigate on behalf of the government in the federal courts,256 dispossessed 
the CO of any authority to “reject” Sikorsky’s claim.257 As such, it contended 
that Sikorsky had failed to meet the jurisdictional prerequisites of the CDA, 
and the claim therefore needed to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.258
Judge Lettow rejected the government’s argument, reasoning that regardless 
of whether Maropakis applied, the court had jurisdiction to hear Sikorsky’s 
affirmative defenses, one way or another.259 “On the assumption that Maropakis 
does not apply to Sikorsky’s affirmative defenses, the court would continue to 
entertain Sikorsky’s affirmative defenses as pled in Sikorsky’s first complaint. 
Alternatively, if Maropakis’s filing requirement does apply to Sikorsky’s 
affirmative defenses, then this court manifestly has jurisdiction over Sikorsky’s 
second complaint . . . .”260 If Maropakis applied, Sikorsky’s claim for affirmative 
defenses submitted to the CO would be a separate claim from the litigation.261 
Thus, “the contracting officer’s choice to decline issuing a final decision on 
Sikorsky’s second set of claims would be incorrect: the claims would not have 
been already in litigation, so the contracting officer should have issued a final 
decision within 60 days or a reasonable time.”262 The CO’s refusal to decide 
the claim would constitute a deemed denial and the second complaint would 
be jurisdictionally proper, though still redundant of the defenses raised in 
the first complaint.263 Judge Lettow reasoned that “Sikorsky need not be put 
to the Hobson’s choice of preserving its affirmative defenses only through its 
original complaint or not at all.”264
The court attempted to use a footnote to differentiate Maropakis from the 
situation at hand:265
255 Id.
256 See Schooner, Postscript, supra note 12, at 5 (citing Sharman Co. v. United States, 2 
F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); see also Ralph C. Nash, Contracting Officer Decision During 
Litigation: Are They Valid?, 22 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 13 (Feb. 2008); Ralph C. Nash & 
John Cibinic, Procedural Litigation on Default Terminations: Will it Never End?, 8 No. 7 
Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 42 (July 1994).
257 See Sikorsky, 102 Fed. Cl. at 47.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 47–48.
260 Id. at 47.
261 Id. at 47–48.
262 Id. at 48.
263 Id.
264 Id. at 47.
265 Id. at 48 n.14 (citations omitted).
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First, Maropakis’ holding only extends to counterclaim defenses that seek contract 
modification. The Maropakis plaintiff sought an extension of time, which is typically 
considered an equitable adjustment and resolved under doctrines concerning contractual 
changes. By contrast, Sikorsky’s affirmative defenses are traditional common law defenses 
that are independent of the means by which a party seeks equitable adjustment to a 
government contract.266
Judge Lettow further differentiated Maropakis, stating that Maropakis only 
had one affirmative defense that shared an identity with its dismissed claim 
for time extensions.267
Second, Maropakis’ dismissed claim for a time extension “was the only defense asserted 
against the government’s counterclaim for liquidated damages.” The time-extension 
claim could not be used as a sword, so in the procedural setting of that case, neither 
could it be used as a shield. Sikorsky’s affirmative defenses are not claims for additional 
relief, nor is Sikorsky in the hapless position of proffering a defense that shares an 
identity with a dismissed claim.268
Nonetheless, in the end, the court declined to decide whether Maropakis 
applied to the situation at hand, finding that it had jurisdiction to hear 
Sikorsky’s affirmative defenses either way.269
The good news was that the judge sought to differentiate Maropakis, give 
it a limited reading, and constrain its application.270 However, because the 
other COFC judges are not bound by Sikorsky’s holding, the contractor 
community holds no guarantee that Maropakis will be read narrowly before 
266 Id. (citations omitted) (citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. of Am. v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 
75, 97 (2006)); see also Metric Constr. Co. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 804, 818 (2008); John 
Cibinic, Jr. et al., Administration of Government Contracts 567–76 (4th ed. 2006).
267 Sikorsky, 102 Fed. Cl. at 48 n.14.
268 Id. (citing Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2010)); Sun Eagle Corp. 
v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 465, 474 (1991) (invoking Elgin Builders, Inc. v. United States, 
10 Cl. Ct. 40, 44 (1986) for the proposition that, absent presentment to the CO, a con-
tractor’s defenses are “limited to the nature of, and the issues presented in, the assessment 
itself,” rather than those that could serve as affirmative claims for contract modification). 
Similarly, in Z.A.N. Co. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 298 (1984), the court observed that the 
finality of a CO’s decision
is not [diminished] by any absence of certification by the contractor when it seeks 
solely to defend against the government’s assertion of its claim for liquidated dam-
ages. On the other hand, if the contractor further asserts, in addition to its defense of 
the government’s claim, its right to additional relief such as extensions of time and/
or money . . . , then this portion of the dispute may be identified as a claim by the 
contractor . . . .
Id. at 304 (footnote and citation omitted).
269 Sikorsky, 102 Fed. Cl. at 48.
270 See Schooner, Postscript, supra note 12.
718 The Federal Circuit Bar Journal Vol. 21, No. 4
Judge Lettow’s colleagues.271 Consequently, contractors must continue to act 
with “an abundance of caution” to preserve their affirmative defenses,272 with 
no guaranteed outcome.
2. Structural Concepts, Inc. v. United States
A second COFC case applying Maropakis gives greater cause for concern 
because of the government’s argument before the court.273 In Structural Concepts, 
Inc. v. United States,274 Structural Concepts, Inc. (“SCI”) contracted with the 
Air Force, in 1999, to alter and repair a building on a base within a year.275 
SCI did not complete the project until late 2003 or early 2004.276 SCI filed a 
claim with its CO, claiming damages in the form of additional compensation 
due to government-caused delay and other government actions.277 While the 
government admitted suspending work and modifying the contract to extend 
the completion date, it nonetheless asserted that SCI was responsible for 384 
days of delay, resulting in $776,448 in liquidated damages.278 The CO denied 
SCI’s claim and upheld the government’s liquidated damages assessment.279 SCI 
filed suit in the COFC, and the government counterclaimed for liquidated 
damages.280 Both parties moved for summary judgment on the liquidated 
damages claim.281
The government asserted that, under Maropakis, the court lacked jurisdiction 
to hear SCI’s affirmative defenses to the government’s counterclaim, because 
the contractor had not presented “a separate claim to the CO providing 
adequate notice of the total number of days requested in extension as a defense 
to the Government’s claim assessing liquidated damages.”282 Fortunately, 
Judge Bush saw this argument as an extension of Maropakis and refused to 
accept it.283 The court differentiated Maropakis, noting “that SCI did present 
a valid CDA claim to the CO requesting damages caused by government-
271 Id. at ¶ 21.
272 Sikorsky, 102 Fed. Cl. at 44.
273 Structural Concepts, Inc. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 84 (2012).
274 Id.
275 Id. at 84–85.
276 Id. at 85.
277 Id.




282 Id. at 89.
283 Elizabeth A. Ferrell & Justin M. Ganderson, COFC Rejects Government’s Attempt 
to Extend Holding in M. Maropakis Carpentry v. United States, 97 Fed. Cont. Rep. 227 
(Mar. 6, 2012).
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caused delay, placing this plaintiff in a different position than the plaintiff 
in Maropakis. Thus, the Maropakis decision provides limited guidance in the 
case at bar.”284 The court found that Maropakis did “not directly address the 
question of whether a contractor who has already filed a valid CDA claim for 
damages caused by government delay must necessarily then file a separate claim 
once it has learned the full extent of the government’s liquidated damages 
assessment.”285 Judge Bush looked to other Federal Circuit precedent, stating 
that CDA claims before the COFC need not rigidly adhere to the original 
claim presented to the CO, but only must “‘arise from the same operative 
facts, claim essentially the same relief, and merely assert differing legal 
theories for that recovery.’”286 The court found that much of SCI’s defense 
to the government’s counterclaim had, indeed, been presented to the CO.287 
In the end, Judge Bush denied the cross motions for summary judgment on 
the issue of liquidated damages, finding that SCI’s claim for damages due to 
government delay and the government’s claim for liquidated damages were 
so related that they must both be preserved for trial.288
While the issue resolved favorably for SCI, the case shows just how far 
Maropakis may be taken by another judge who is not bound by the Structural 
Concepts decision.289 Under the government’s theory, a contractor would need 
to present a separate claim to the CO even if it had already made a claim 
for time extensions under the CDA.290 In Structural Concepts, the government 
specifically contended that even if SCI’s original claim asserted that the 
government caused some of the delays covered by the liquidated damages 
assessment, the claim did not cover the entire period of delay claimed by the 
government.291 Therefore, not only would a contractor have to make a claim 
for government-caused delays, but it would have to file a separate claim if the 
government’s liquidated damages claim covered a greater or different time 
period.292 Perhaps most troubling is that the government did not need to read 
Maropakis all that broadly to form its theory. If a contractor’s affirmative 
defenses to a government claim for liquidated damages differ from its original 
claim for delay damages, then under Maropakis a judge could rule that those 
284 Structural, 103 Fed. Cl. at 89.
285 Id.
286 Id. (quoting Scott Timber Co. v. United States, 333 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
287 Id. (quoting Scott Timber Co., 333 F.3d at 1365).
288 Id. at 91.
289 See Ferrell & Ganderson, supra note 283 (warning contractors that another COFC 
judge is not bound by Structural and may not rule as favorably).
290 Structural, 103 Fed. Cl. at 89.
291 See id. at 89.
292 See id.
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portions of the affirmative defenses not covered by the contractor’s claim have 
not met the jurisdictional prerequisites of the CDA.293
Sikorsky and Structural Concepts demonstrate just how abundantly cautious 
contractors must be (in preparing and submitting unnecessary and unproductive 
claims that anticipate government claims for liquidated damages).294 After 
Sikorsky, a contractor cannot be sure what types of defenses are covered by 
Maropakis and whether it must file a separate claim with the CO to assert such 
defenses.295 Under the government’s theory in Structural Concepts (which the 
government is in no way estopped from attempting before all other COFC 
judges), the contractor must submit a separate claim for its affirmative defenses 
even where it has presented its own claim for delay damages (or at the very 
least must ensure that its claim asserts enough to counter the entire amount 
claimed by the government in liquidated damages).296
Accordingly, Maropakis and these recent decisions will undoubtedly lead to 
contractors preparing and submitting multiple claims at multiple times to the 
CO “out of an abundance of caution,” generating inefficiency and unnecessary 
consideration of claims both at the agency level and before the COFC and 
the BCAs.297 “Although [the] requirement [to submit a valid CDA claim to 
preserve defenses] . . . is counterintuitive and ignores the distinction between 
an affirmative claim and a defense to a government claim, contractors cannot 
dismiss the importance of this necessary, albeit artificial, step.”298
3. Another COFC and BCA Split?
The inefficiencies created by Maropakis might also be analogized to the process 
through which a contractor can defend against another type of government 
claim—termination for default.299 Because a termination for default is a 
government claim, the contractor need not present its own claim to the CO 
in order to merely defend against the government’s claim (or challenge the 
propriety of the default termination) before the BCAs.300 The standard default 
clauses identify a number of defenses that a contractor can make against a 
293 See Maropakis II, 609 F.3d 1323, 1329–32 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
294 Schooner, Postscript, supra note 12, at 18–19, 21; Structural, 103 Fed. Cl. at 87–91.
295 Schooner, Postscript, supra note 12, at 18–19, 21.
296 See Structural, 103 F.3d at 87–91.
297 However, Sikorsky has virtually no bearing on proceedings before the BCAs because the 
agencies retain authority over the matters even after the case goes before one of the boards, 
so a CO would not lose his or her authority as they may when a case goes to the COFC.
298 Ferrell & Ganderson, supra note 283.
299 See Schooner, Postscript, supra note 12, at 21.
300 See id.
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termination for default,301 and the BCAs do not require a contractor to submit 
its own claim to the CO to appeal a default termination.302 Before the COFC, 
however, the contractor must present a settlement proposal for a (hypothetical) 
termination for convenience as a “claim” to the CO before defending against 
a termination for default, even though a termination for convenience has 
yet to occur.303 The difference in COFC and the BCA procedures reflects one 
of the most significant differences today in what, generally, is perceived as 
concurrent and parallel jurisdiction.304
In defense of the COFC, the case of defending against a termination for 
default is a much more compelling case for requiring a contractor to submit 
its own affirmative claim, because the single remedy for invalidating a 
termination for default is a convenience termination, which brings with it an 
explicitly regulated monetary recovery.305 Conversely, the remedy for defeating 
a liquidated damages claim is simply that the contractor does not owe the 
government any money;306 the contractor receives no affirmative monetary 
recovery. Therefore, there is little justification for requiring a contractor to take 
the inefficient extra step of filing a separate claim before asserting its defenses.
The government’s litigation strategy in Sikorsky eventually might lead 
to a split between the COFC and the BCAs similar to that present in the 
termination for default context. In light of Maropakis, any COFC judge could 
accept this, or a similar, argument from the government and hold that: (1) a 
contractor cannot raise affirmative defenses that it did not previously present 
to its CO; and (2) the contractor cannot achieve anything by presenting the 
defenses in a separate claim because the CO lost any decisional authority when 
the contractor initiated suit in the COFC. Conversely, because a CO retains 
authority while a matter is pending before the BCAs, this distinction could 
301 For example:
the Contractor shall not be liable for any excess costs if the failure to perform the 
contract arises from causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence 
of the Contractor. Examples of such causes include (1) acts of God or of the public 
enemy, (2)  acts of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, 
(3) fires, (4) floods, (5) epidemics, (6) quarantine restrictions[,] (7) strikes, (8) freight 
embargoes, and (9) unusually severe weather. In each instance the failure to perform 
must be beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the Contractor.
48 C.F.R. § 52.249-8(c) (2000).
302 See Steven L. Schooner, More Bites of Red Herring: Claims Court/BCA Differences in 
Handling Default Terminations, 2 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 21, at 55 (Apr. 1988) (quoting 
Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 828 F.2d 759 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
303 See Schooner, Postscript, supra note 12, at 21.
304 See Schooner, supra note 302, at 55.
305 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-8(g); see also Schooner, Postscript, supra note 12, at 21.
306 48 C.F.R. § 52.211-11(c); see also Schooner, Postscript, supra note 12, at 21.
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create another split between the courts and the boards. Yet little purpose—
other than to artificially restrict a contractor’s pre-existing statutory right to 
an election of forum—would be served by such a split.
All of which points to the same conclusion—Maropakis was wrongly decided. 
If left unchanged, the decision will continue to cause costly problems, not 
only for contractors, but also for the government, by generating expensive 
and unproductive litigation. This result stands in direct opposition to the 
intent of the CDA—to streamline the contract disputes process and avoid 
costly litigation.307 Therefore, in order to abide by the legislative intent of the 
CDA, to conform the contract disputes process to well-accepted rules of civil 
procedure, and to prevent further unjust results, the CDA should be amended 
to supersede Maropakis.
III. Solution: Amending the Contract Disputes Act
Maropakis unfairly disadvantaged government contractors attempting to 
exercise their right to defend themselves in the congressionally constructed 
contract disputes process. Of course, an en banc Federal Circuit panel could 
quickly undo the damage done and restore the status quo. Until then, a 
legislative solution is necessary to restore a level playing field in government 
contracts litigation. The Maropakis decision nullifies the Supreme Court’s 
consistent admonition that “[w]hen the United States enters into contract 
relations, its rights and duties therein are governed generally by the law 
applicable to contracts between private individuals.”308 However, as the law 
currently stands, contractors are held to a much more rigid, inefficient, and 
unfair standard than the government.
When a contractor makes an affirmative claim, it must follow the require-
ments of the CDA, certifying (when appropriate) the amount it claims and 
providing full support for each assertion and the amount claimed.309 Conversely, 
when the government makes a “claim,” it simply demands something from 
the contractor, giving only a short explanation in support of its assertions. 
As a result, the only way a contractor can dispute the government claim is by 
taking on the role of the plaintiff and filing suit in the COFC or appealing 
to the BCAs.
Now, under Maropakis, when the government asserts a right to contractor 
funds, the contractor must not only anticipate but also fully disclose its 
defenses to the government’s claim before it even initiates suit in the COFC 
or the BCAs. To be clear, before the government files its initial pleading in 
307 See supra Part II.C.
308 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934); see also Franconia Assocs. v. United 
States, 536 U.S. 129, 141 (2002).
309 See CDA, 41 U.S.C. § 7103 (Supp. V 2011).
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an action in which the government is claiming money, the contractor must 
identify and fully document its defenses by submitting a claim outlining those 
defenses.310 Such a requirement, that a contractor must anticipate all defenses 
before it even knows the details of the government’s litigation strategy, is as 
unfair as it is inefficient. And, again, the government has no corresponding 
burden when defending against contractor claims.
To remedy such an unfair and inefficient result, Congress should amend 
the CDA. The CDA should be amended to treat affirmative defenses just as 
they are treated under the rules of civil procedure. Further, Congress should 
explicitly amend the Act to state that a contractor need not submit its own 
claim in order to raise affirmative defenses to a government claim.
Congress should amend the CDA to simply state that affirmative defenses 
under the CDA are treated the same as under traditional civil procedure rules. 
For example, Congress could add to 41 U.S.C. § 7101311 the following language:
(10) Affirmative defense. The term “affirmative defense” shall be interpreted consistent 
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to title 28. A contractor need not 
submit a claim to raise an affirmative defense to a government claim in an appeal to 
an agency board of contract appeals or in litigation in a Federal court.
The proposed amendment to the CDA would allow for a more fair and 
equitable result for contractors. Maropakis left contractors who were not 
inclined to pursue monetary claims against the government unnecessarily 
defenseless when the government chooses to demand money from them.312 
As a result, when the COFC refused to exercise jurisdiction over Maropakis’s 
defense, the government may have received a windfall.313 Under the proposed 
amendments to the CDA, the outcome of Maropakis may have been markedly 
different. The COFC would have had jurisdiction over Maropakis’s factual 
defenses, particularly its defense that the government had contributed to the 
310 See id. Additionally, the contractor must keep in mind the different time limitations in 
the two fora, thereby further complicating the problem. From the date of receipt of a CO’s 
decision, a contractor has either ninety days to file a notice of appeal to the appropriate board 
or twelve months to file a formal complaint in the COFC. CDA, 41 U.S.C. § 7104(a), (b)
(1), (3) (Supp. V 2011). While either party may appeal the decision to the Federal Circuit, 
the time limitations for an appeal differ. Once a judgment or order is rendered, a party has 
60 days to appeal an adverse COFC decision, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B)(i), but 120 days 
to appeal an adverse board decision, CDA, 41 U.S.C. § 7107(a)(1) (Supp. V 2011). See 
Schaengold, Choice of Forum 2008, supra note 143, at 311, 336.
311 The authors do not suggest that this particularly placement is unique or superior to 
alternatives. For example, similar language might be placed at 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(6) or 
41 U.S.C. § 7105(e)(3) (Supp. V 2011).
312 See Maropakis II, 609 F.3d at 1334–35 (Newman, J., dissenting).
313 See id.
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delays.314 Maropakis could have defended against the liquidated damages claim 
and prevented the government from recovering all or part of the liquidated 
damages claimed.315 But again, Maropakis would have been entitled to nothing 
more than the right to defend itself in court.316 The contractor could not 
have recovered added expenses due to the delay, nor could it have recovered 
interest on added expenses or on the portion of the contract balance that 
was withheld.317
Conclusion
The Federal Circuit’s drive-by jurisdictional decision in Maropakis broke 
from precedent, contravened the purpose of the CDA, and produced inef-
ficiency and uncertainty. Subsequent COFC cases offer compelling examples 
of the inefficient litigation that is sure to result from Maropakis. Comparisons 
with basic principles of civil procedure and case law under similar statutory 
schemes illuminate the injustice produced by the decision. This lengthy list 
of problems can only be solved by: (1) a Supreme Court or Federal Circuit 
decision overturning Maropakis, or (2) a statutory amendment to the CDA. 
Failure to change course may generate lucrative work for the bar, but no obvious 
policy is served by maintaining the status quo. If the Federal Circuit chooses 
not to right its error, a prompt, simple, statutory solution is appropriate.
314 See id. at 1326, 1329–30 (majority opinion).
315 See id. at 1329–30.
316 See id.
317 See Ruhnau-Evans-Ruhnau Assocs. v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 217, 218–19 (1983); 
Nash, A Weird Thought, supra note 6.
